THE PROBLEM OF ABSOLUTE FREEDOM
(Charles Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society; Dr. Gordon Carkner)
“Complete freedom is absurd; it seeks to escape all historical-cultural situation and narrative. Pure freedom without limits is nothing; it has no context; it is chaos, destructive; it is no place, a void in which nothing would be worth doing. It is often abused. Foucault’s view
of freedom, although attractive for its pioneering spirit and some of its tools for creative self-articulation, is quite vulnerable to manipulation (a precarious autonomy); it is both exhilarating and dangerous. This empty freedom hollows out the self and can be filled with almost any moral trajectory or motive, whether constructive or destructive.”
Further, Taylor sees four dangers with this stance:
a. Self-trivialization and lack of depth
b. The Dionysian danger:
If free activity cannot be defined in opposition to our nature and situation, on pain of vacuity, it cannot simply be identified with following our strongest, or most persistent, or most all-embracing desire either. That would make it impossible to say that our freedom was ever thwarted by our own compulsions, fears, or obsessions. One needs to be able to separate compulsions, fears, addictions from higher more authentic aspirations.... We have to be able to distinguish between compulsions, fears, addictions from those aspirations which we endorse with our whole soul. (Taylor, 1979, p. 157, 158)
c. Problem of despair:
This type of freedom can be a ruse to trap one inside one’s self, as Kierkegaard wrote—with the risk of nihilism and the death of meaning
d. Lost potential in relationships:
It rejects the possibility of human complementarity through a quest for an uncolonized, suspicious self. It is a key insight that absolute freedom misses the point about the distortions of inauthentic (suspect) and malevolent desires, and how they can lead to a life of mediocrity, self-indulgence, or even self-destruction. We see here the contrast of freedom as an escape from responsibility to community (Foucault) and freedom as calling within community (Taylor) grounded in the acceptance of one’s defining situation, together with its opportunities and responsibilities. Freedom that limits itself to discussion of new possibilities of thinking and action, but heroically and ironically refuses to provide any evaluative orientation as to which possibilities and changes are desirable, is in danger of becoming empty or worse, predatory and malevolent. This is the darker side of radical freedom, rendering it a dangerous first principle. We need a more full-blooded conception of freedom and individuality.
It is clear that, for Plato, the very definition of justice requires a higher and a lower and distinguishes our love of one from our love of the other. Christian faith could take this idea over while giving it a different content, and so Augustine speaks explicitly of “two loves”. Recognition that there is a difference in us between higher and lower, straight and crooked, or loving and self-absorbed desires opens an intellectual space in which philosophy has a crucial role—as the attempt to articulate and define the deepest and most general features of some subject matter—here moral being. (Taylor, 1999, pp. 120-21)
Thus, we are arguing that radical freedom and individualism needs to be redeemed or recovered. One wants to win through to a freedom that includes limitations, admission of finitude and responsibility for the Other.
The redemption of freedom is liberation from freedom for freedom, from the destructive consequences of absolute self-constituted freedom and for the exercise of redeemed and created human freedom which is called to find fulfilment in communion with God ... Redeemed freedom is ... essentially finite, relative freedom, freedom which is dependent on finding its orientation in the disclosure of the truth of the gospel ... freedom as created, as the freedom of creatures whose freedom is not constituted by them but for them. (C. Schwöbel, 1995, p. 78)