“Land that is common in England or any other country where there is plenty of people under government who have money and commerce” is perfectly legitimate, collectively owned property, according to Locke. In this setting, unlike the state of nature, “no one can enclose or appropriate any part without the consent of all his fellow‐commoners; because this is left common by compact, i.e., by the law of the land, [Sui Generis Common Law deriving from Admiralty Jurisdiction, AKA Inland Piracy] which is not to be violated. And though it be common in respect of some men, it is not so to all mankind, [AKA Persons or "Things"] but is the joint property of this country or this parish.”9 America represents a different sort of commons, wide open and available to all: not collective property, but rather the antithesis of property. Enclosure at home and enclosure overseas may be equally desirable ends, but they have to come about by very different means according to Locke. In England, voluntary agreement (and presumably compensation) is a must, whereas enclosure in America requires no one's permission.10 This procedural divergence over enclosure, critical to Locke's implied theory of colonial property formation, rests on the elision of two different criteria. Legitimate common property is local/particular, and it is instituted in law, whereas pre‐colonial America knows no law, and its lands constitute a commons of universal scope: it corresponds to nature itself. Credit, Commons and Enclosure in the Colonization of North America https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article/117/2/365/30072?login=false