Behind the gas mafia - part 1
In a peace context, despite that Israel signed Oslo Accords in 1993 with Palestinians, including a part about energy cooperation, Gaza’s gas field development and the energy relation with Palestinians are still frozen.
However, Israel still uses energy supply as a weapon against the Palestinians in order to control their energy needs.
...
So, in other words, the Palestine question is still without an agreed settlement. This relation will not change under current Palestinian capacities that limit their efforts to meet energy independence, which requires a sovereign state and complete control in the ground and borders.
Still, Israel is not interested in a positive peace with Syria, Lebanon, or even Palestinians; Israel realizes its energy interests without cost.
On the threats side, it is clear that Israeli energy security's main threats, based on Eisenkot and Siboni's definition, are not coming from sub-conventional threats of militants like Hamas or Hezbollah.
They can’t control the Israeli energy routes or supply chains in the Mediterranean offshore. They can do limited interruptions in energy supply, like cyber threats or damaging pipelines or networks, but clearly, they will not be vulnerable to energy supply. The maximum action from Hamas or Hezbollah may be to cut off some gas or oil pipelines like what happened in Sinai after Egyptian Revolution in 2011, and Israel will be able to deal with it.
The main threats of energy in Israel are still the conventional threats of states such as Iran. The conventional threats may also happen even by peaceful states like Egypt or Turkey, conditioned by considerable regime changes. This political position may also stop the energy supply chains from or to Israel. Egypt can interrupt energy shipping in the Tiran strait, Suez Canal, or exporting gas in the East Mediterranean, while Turkey can cut-off the BTC supply or Bosporus energy ships.
In a peace context, despite that Israel signed Oslo Accords in 1993 with Palestinians, including a part about energy cooperation, Gaza’s gas field development and the energy relation with Palestinians are still frozen.
However, Israel still uses energy supply as a weapon against the Palestinians in order to control their energy needs.
...
So, in other words, the Palestine question is still without an agreed settlement. This relation will not change under current Palestinian capacities that limit their efforts to meet energy independence, which requires a sovereign state and complete control in the ground and borders.
Still, Israel is not interested in a positive peace with Syria, Lebanon, or even Palestinians; Israel realizes its energy interests without cost.
On the threats side, it is clear that Israeli energy security's main threats, based on Eisenkot and Siboni's definition, are not coming from sub-conventional threats of militants like Hamas or Hezbollah.
They can’t control the Israeli energy routes or supply chains in the Mediterranean offshore. They can do limited interruptions in energy supply, like cyber threats or damaging pipelines or networks, but clearly, they will not be vulnerable to energy supply. The maximum action from Hamas or Hezbollah may be to cut off some gas or oil pipelines like what happened in Sinai after Egyptian Revolution in 2011, and Israel will be able to deal with it.
The main threats of energy in Israel are still the conventional threats of states such as Iran. The conventional threats may also happen even by peaceful states like Egypt or Turkey, conditioned by considerable regime changes. This political position may also stop the energy supply chains from or to Israel. Egypt can interrupt energy shipping in the Tiran strait, Suez Canal, or exporting gas in the East Mediterranean, while Turkey can cut-off the BTC supply or Bosporus energy ships.