Genocide and Suicide Terrorism - Part 2
Part 1: https://t.me/IsraelWarBullshit/945
In Gaza, after the separation barrier was completed and the Second Intifada had begun, most militants were in fact compelled to turn away from suicide bombing and toward guerilla attacks and the launching of Qassam rockets and mortar shells at Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip and Israel proper.
No such launches were recorded in 2000, but 516 took place in 2001. Their number rose steadily for the next three years to 1,475 in 2004 and then tapered off somewhat to just over 1,000 in 2005 (Intelligence and Information Center 2006, 24; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007).
In the West Bank, the situation was different. The rate of killing of Palestinians by Israel was only about half as high as in Gaza. At the same time, the frequency of Palestinian deaths was more sensitive to the threat level than was the case in Gaza. The correlation between the monthly number of Palestinian deaths and the monthly number of suicide missions originating in the region was strong and in the direction that Marshall’s rational choice theory would lead one to expect.
Thus, when threat was high in the West Bank, the killing of Palestinians by the Israeli state rose. When threat was low, the killing of Palestinians dropped off.
Interestingly, frontier-like Gaza was less subject to assassinations than was the West Bank. Nearly twice as many assassinations took place in the West Bank (135) as in Gaza (72).
In addition, a chorus of human rights groups, media outlets, the United Nations, and European governments soon criticized Israeli state violence, calling for constraint and reminding Israel that state violence against civilians violates international human rights norms that have become deeply entrenched since World War II.
About suicide terrorists
https://t.me/TerrorismTelegram/349
https://t.me/TerrorismTelegram/356
https://t.me/TerrorismTelegram/357
https://t.me/TerrorismTelegram/358
by University of Toronto
Part 1: https://t.me/IsraelWarBullshit/945
In Gaza, after the separation barrier was completed and the Second Intifada had begun, most militants were in fact compelled to turn away from suicide bombing and toward guerilla attacks and the launching of Qassam rockets and mortar shells at Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip and Israel proper.
No such launches were recorded in 2000, but 516 took place in 2001. Their number rose steadily for the next three years to 1,475 in 2004 and then tapered off somewhat to just over 1,000 in 2005 (Intelligence and Information Center 2006, 24; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007).
In the West Bank, the situation was different. The rate of killing of Palestinians by Israel was only about half as high as in Gaza. At the same time, the frequency of Palestinian deaths was more sensitive to the threat level than was the case in Gaza. The correlation between the monthly number of Palestinian deaths and the monthly number of suicide missions originating in the region was strong and in the direction that Marshall’s rational choice theory would lead one to expect.
Thus, when threat was high in the West Bank, the killing of Palestinians by the Israeli state rose. When threat was low, the killing of Palestinians dropped off.
Interestingly, frontier-like Gaza was less subject to assassinations than was the West Bank. Nearly twice as many assassinations took place in the West Bank (135) as in Gaza (72).
In addition, a chorus of human rights groups, media outlets, the United Nations, and European governments soon criticized Israeli state violence, calling for constraint and reminding Israel that state violence against civilians violates international human rights norms that have become deeply entrenched since World War II.
About suicide terrorists
https://t.me/TerrorismTelegram/349
https://t.me/TerrorismTelegram/356
https://t.me/TerrorismTelegram/357
https://t.me/TerrorismTelegram/358
by University of Toronto