🎙️Interview of Russia’s Ambassador to Norway Nikolay Korchunov to «High North News» (December 23, 2024)
Key points:
• We have noticed some improvements in the stagnant state of the Arctic Council (AC). I am referring to the gradual resumption of the activities of the working groups of the Council in the autumn of this year. However, I would rather not exaggerate the results – the self-restraining decision, previously adopted by a number of the AC member-states, unfortunately, continues to weaken the spirit and atmosphere of cooperation, and negatively affects the current state of affairs in the organization. Arctic Council, in a sense, has turned into a virtual forum.
• We have no high expectations about the upcoming AC chairship of Denmark. As far as I am aware, Copenhagen hasn’t held by far any consultations with Russia regarding its plans for 2025-2027, nor have they informed us about their priorities. That said I believe that the success of the upcoming chairship of Denmark will largely depend on what role the actual Arctic territories – the Faroe Islands and Greenland will have.
• We assess positively Norway's work as the Arctic Council chair. In the current challenging period, we note the efforts of the Norwegian chairship to resume the regular full-scale activities of the Council, though the negative impact of decisions previously taken by some AC member states is evident. In addition, not all of them share the Norwegian approach to get the Arctic Council back to full-format work. Time will tell, whether Norway and other member-states are ready to cooperate constructively.
• My key message is that the lack of political dialogue the loss of trust, as well as the alienation among the leading actors of the cooperation in the region inevitably leads to an increase in uncertainty and creates a vacuum that others will seek to fill. It is clear that some non-regional actors seek to assert themselves at the expense of the Arctic states. Their rise in the Arctic affairs may have limiting impact on the capabilities of the Arctic states to effectively manage the region.
• The cooperation of Russia and China in the Arctic is multifaceted, focused on deepening practical cooperation in the interests of sustainable development of the region and is based on the support of heads of state.
• In November 2024, Russia and China held the first meeting of the Subcommittee on Cooperation on the Northern Sea Route. The purpose of this new format is to work out all the mechanisms and details that would help foster safe and sustainable Arctic shipping for the sake of developing this global transport corridor and creating a joint program for expansion of transit on the NSR.
• Russian-Chinese cooperation in the Arctic is not directed against third countries and does not lie in the military dimension.
• Priorities of Russia in the Arctic derive from the provisions of the Strategy for Developing the Russian Arctic Zone and Ensuring National Security until 2035. On this basis, we cooperate with all actors involved, including China.
• While focus on confrontation, antagonism and forceful scenarios to ensure their interests in the Arctic at the expense of others are increasingly prevailing in the approaches of some Arctic states, the Russian strategy aims at finding solutions to other challenges – sustainable development of the region, preserving the fragile nature of the Arctic as well as the way of life of Indigenous Peoples and overall ensuring the well-being of all people living in the North. As to the international dimension, the Strategy highlights the importance to cooperate on search and rescue, economic and humanitarian ties, scientific work, support of Indigenous Peoples.
• We note with concern securitization of the Arctic policies of other AC member-states. The key task is to preserve the Arctic as the territory of peace, stability and mutually beneficial cooperation. Pending issues on the Arctic agenda do not lie in the military dimension.
Read in full
Key points:
• We have noticed some improvements in the stagnant state of the Arctic Council (AC). I am referring to the gradual resumption of the activities of the working groups of the Council in the autumn of this year. However, I would rather not exaggerate the results – the self-restraining decision, previously adopted by a number of the AC member-states, unfortunately, continues to weaken the spirit and atmosphere of cooperation, and negatively affects the current state of affairs in the organization. Arctic Council, in a sense, has turned into a virtual forum.
• We have no high expectations about the upcoming AC chairship of Denmark. As far as I am aware, Copenhagen hasn’t held by far any consultations with Russia regarding its plans for 2025-2027, nor have they informed us about their priorities. That said I believe that the success of the upcoming chairship of Denmark will largely depend on what role the actual Arctic territories – the Faroe Islands and Greenland will have.
• We assess positively Norway's work as the Arctic Council chair. In the current challenging period, we note the efforts of the Norwegian chairship to resume the regular full-scale activities of the Council, though the negative impact of decisions previously taken by some AC member states is evident. In addition, not all of them share the Norwegian approach to get the Arctic Council back to full-format work. Time will tell, whether Norway and other member-states are ready to cooperate constructively.
• My key message is that the lack of political dialogue the loss of trust, as well as the alienation among the leading actors of the cooperation in the region inevitably leads to an increase in uncertainty and creates a vacuum that others will seek to fill. It is clear that some non-regional actors seek to assert themselves at the expense of the Arctic states. Their rise in the Arctic affairs may have limiting impact on the capabilities of the Arctic states to effectively manage the region.
• The cooperation of Russia and China in the Arctic is multifaceted, focused on deepening practical cooperation in the interests of sustainable development of the region and is based on the support of heads of state.
• In November 2024, Russia and China held the first meeting of the Subcommittee on Cooperation on the Northern Sea Route. The purpose of this new format is to work out all the mechanisms and details that would help foster safe and sustainable Arctic shipping for the sake of developing this global transport corridor and creating a joint program for expansion of transit on the NSR.
• Russian-Chinese cooperation in the Arctic is not directed against third countries and does not lie in the military dimension.
• Priorities of Russia in the Arctic derive from the provisions of the Strategy for Developing the Russian Arctic Zone and Ensuring National Security until 2035. On this basis, we cooperate with all actors involved, including China.
• While focus on confrontation, antagonism and forceful scenarios to ensure their interests in the Arctic at the expense of others are increasingly prevailing in the approaches of some Arctic states, the Russian strategy aims at finding solutions to other challenges – sustainable development of the region, preserving the fragile nature of the Arctic as well as the way of life of Indigenous Peoples and overall ensuring the well-being of all people living in the North. As to the international dimension, the Strategy highlights the importance to cooperate on search and rescue, economic and humanitarian ties, scientific work, support of Indigenous Peoples.
• We note with concern securitization of the Arctic policies of other AC member-states. The key task is to preserve the Arctic as the territory of peace, stability and mutually beneficial cooperation. Pending issues on the Arctic agenda do not lie in the military dimension.
Read in full