Got a possibility to test internet access on a Russian residential IP. Most russian websites work fine, unless you want more freedom. The screenshots above are from the dpi-detector tool towards foreign resources, and the results were somewhat expected:
1. Plain UDP DNS spoofing
2. Blacklisted domains (on this vantage point) mostly L3/IP blocked (otherwise SYN would go through)
3-4. Cloud provider connectivity restricted / blocked (16-20 KB block)
5. Telegram connectivity fails (DNS spoofing, Down/uplink/DC unavailable)
The general statistics on the last image (lines 2-3) indicate only 17% of the tested domains and 13% of cloud provider address spaces accessible. This much better compared to the current network situation in Iran, but worse than it was just three months ago (AS-based blacklists and Telegram restrictions have been added since). It doesn't seem like the restrictions will be lifted anytime soon (apart from the time before elections in autumn 2026, maybe). On the contrary:
▶️ the total throughput of DPI system is expected to double by 2030. The budget of the digital control program was raised accordingly.
▶️ large tech companies heavily cooperate with authorities and might use their client-side apps to collect information about VPN servers a device is connected to (particularly on Android). The widely used state-promoted Max messenger has already been suspected to have this behavior.
▶️ about 20 companies that own foreign telecommunications links in Russia have signed an agreement to halt their expansion to enforce VPN detection / blocking by the operators. Alternatively, this may cause all international traffic to be billed at a higher price. A similar pricing model for large amount of mobile traffic towards foreign services should be enforced by mobile operators already this year.
This topic is particularly interesting for me, both from the technical perspective and because I have grandparents in Russia. My grandfather, also an engineer, used to find lots of useful information on YouTube, which was one of the first targets to be hit.
The expansion of digital surveillance took WhatsApp as the first communication channel, and has significantly disrupted Telegram for us. The most convenient way of communication for now is the state-sponsored Max messenger, which I personally don't want to use. Of course, there are methods to bypass the "firewall", a LOT of them, but none of them can be configured by an elderly person on their own.
I am responsible for keeping YouTube alive, and want to keep Telegram video calls working for them, at least for some more time. I may periodically post updates on the digital censorship in Russia and hope to have some good news for you one day (hopefully not about another sophisticated VPN obfuscation method).
If you want an overview / in-depth review of the network protocols used by Russians to access the outer world, you may show some activity under this post :)
#russia #dpi #networking #firewall
1. Plain UDP DNS spoofing
2. Blacklisted domains (on this vantage point) mostly L3/IP blocked (otherwise SYN would go through)
3-4. Cloud provider connectivity restricted / blocked (16-20 KB block)
5. Telegram connectivity fails (DNS spoofing, Down/uplink/DC unavailable)
The general statistics on the last image (lines 2-3) indicate only 17% of the tested domains and 13% of cloud provider address spaces accessible. This much better compared to the current network situation in Iran, but worse than it was just three months ago (AS-based blacklists and Telegram restrictions have been added since). It doesn't seem like the restrictions will be lifted anytime soon (apart from the time before elections in autumn 2026, maybe). On the contrary:
▶️ the total throughput of DPI system is expected to double by 2030. The budget of the digital control program was raised accordingly.
▶️ large tech companies heavily cooperate with authorities and might use their client-side apps to collect information about VPN servers a device is connected to (particularly on Android). The widely used state-promoted Max messenger has already been suspected to have this behavior.
▶️ about 20 companies that own foreign telecommunications links in Russia have signed an agreement to halt their expansion to enforce VPN detection / blocking by the operators. Alternatively, this may cause all international traffic to be billed at a higher price. A similar pricing model for large amount of mobile traffic towards foreign services should be enforced by mobile operators already this year.
This topic is particularly interesting for me, both from the technical perspective and because I have grandparents in Russia. My grandfather, also an engineer, used to find lots of useful information on YouTube, which was one of the first targets to be hit.
The expansion of digital surveillance took WhatsApp as the first communication channel, and has significantly disrupted Telegram for us. The most convenient way of communication for now is the state-sponsored Max messenger, which I personally don't want to use. Of course, there are methods to bypass the "firewall", a LOT of them, but none of them can be configured by an elderly person on their own.
I am responsible for keeping YouTube alive, and want to keep Telegram video calls working for them, at least for some more time. I may periodically post updates on the digital censorship in Russia and hope to have some good news for you one day (hopefully not about another sophisticated VPN obfuscation method).
If you want an overview / in-depth review of the network protocols used by Russians to access the outer world, you may show some activity under this post :)
#russia #dpi #networking #firewall