Forward from: Sovinform
When MIlitary Inaction Is More Murderous than MIlitary Action
The Hezbollah's arsenal is filled overwhelmingly with Iranian weapons. If the IDF gains access to information on the ways in which the Iranian missiles and drones function, not only can the IDF nullify at least some of the IRGC-Hezbollah means of retaliation, it may even gain the capability to hack the systems operating these weapons and then mobilize some of them against the Iranian armed forces.
In these circumstances, we must not ignore the scenario in which, in the next few weeks, the IDF's electronic dominance will be raised to so high a level vis-a-vis the Hezbollah that they hack and gain control over some of the weapons systems, and then, with the IDF infiltration of the Hezbollah ranks so high, use these weapons to 'mistakenly' and 'accidentally' fire against the Hezbollah itself, against the IRGC, and/or against other IRGC-aligned military organizations in the Middle East. The detonation of the pagers is a case in point for this scenario, although things could get worse if no further action is taken.
An IRGC Intelligence Organization officer has confirmed that "burnouts" have taken place in a number of Hezbollah's "Fateh" rocket arsenals. This shows the depth of influence which the IDF has gained over the Hezbollah's own weapons arsenal thus far. Given the annihilation of the Hezbollah cadres and so deep an influence in the Hezbollah's weapons sites, how assured can we really be that these missiles systems will not be hacked and then used to fire upon the Hezbollah itself and its allies?
Moreover, since these Hezbollah weapons are very similar or identical to Iranian weapons, the IDF capability to hack into the Hezbollah's systems also translates to a much higher level of vulnerability of the IRGC Aerospace's weapons systems. The physical land distance between Lebanon and Iran can serve as a buffer for land attacks but not so much against cyber attacks. The more the IDF's intelligence on and cyber-access to Hezbollah weapon arsenals, the more intelligence and cyber-access the Americans will have on the IRGC weapons systems, hence the more these weapons become vulnerable to the US military's hacking, electronic control, and manipulation. A US ability to manipulate the IRGC weapons can create scenarios in which the IRGC weapons end up bombing the Iranian armed forces themselves or even cause new incidents similar to the January 2020 Ukrainian Boeing shoot-down scenario.
The Hezbollah's arsenal is filled overwhelmingly with Iranian weapons. If the IDF gains access to information on the ways in which the Iranian missiles and drones function, not only can the IDF nullify at least some of the IRGC-Hezbollah means of retaliation, it may even gain the capability to hack the systems operating these weapons and then mobilize some of them against the Iranian armed forces.
In these circumstances, we must not ignore the scenario in which, in the next few weeks, the IDF's electronic dominance will be raised to so high a level vis-a-vis the Hezbollah that they hack and gain control over some of the weapons systems, and then, with the IDF infiltration of the Hezbollah ranks so high, use these weapons to 'mistakenly' and 'accidentally' fire against the Hezbollah itself, against the IRGC, and/or against other IRGC-aligned military organizations in the Middle East. The detonation of the pagers is a case in point for this scenario, although things could get worse if no further action is taken.
An IRGC Intelligence Organization officer has confirmed that "burnouts" have taken place in a number of Hezbollah's "Fateh" rocket arsenals. This shows the depth of influence which the IDF has gained over the Hezbollah's own weapons arsenal thus far. Given the annihilation of the Hezbollah cadres and so deep an influence in the Hezbollah's weapons sites, how assured can we really be that these missiles systems will not be hacked and then used to fire upon the Hezbollah itself and its allies?
Moreover, since these Hezbollah weapons are very similar or identical to Iranian weapons, the IDF capability to hack into the Hezbollah's systems also translates to a much higher level of vulnerability of the IRGC Aerospace's weapons systems. The physical land distance between Lebanon and Iran can serve as a buffer for land attacks but not so much against cyber attacks. The more the IDF's intelligence on and cyber-access to Hezbollah weapon arsenals, the more intelligence and cyber-access the Americans will have on the IRGC weapons systems, hence the more these weapons become vulnerable to the US military's hacking, electronic control, and manipulation. A US ability to manipulate the IRGC weapons can create scenarios in which the IRGC weapons end up bombing the Iranian armed forces themselves or even cause new incidents similar to the January 2020 Ukrainian Boeing shoot-down scenario.