Tatarigami_UA

Merry Christmas

If you’re following Russia’s economy, tomorrow is your day: the Central Bank’s rate-setting meeting is set for December 20th at 15:00. Another rate hike is expected, along with more criticism of Nabiullina, as no one can openly admit the war is driving inflation

When Bashar al-Assad’s regime fell in Syria, a critical geopolitical question emerged: can Russia maintain its foothold in the MENA region, and if so, how? What does this mean for Ukraine? Below are the key points from the latest Frontelligence Insight report:

Maxar satellite images, dated December 17, show an unusual buildup of vehicles at the Tartus Naval Base. Video from site show that most of these vehicles are logistical, with only a few appearing to be combat vehicles. We identified approximately 150 vehicles and 29 containers

It is assessed that the vehicles are likely being prepared for evacuation from the Tartus by naval vessels. Indications suggest that two Russian cargo ships, Sparta and Ursa Major, could be involved in the operation. It could take over a week for them to reach the port

While it cannot be confirmed with absolute certainty that all these vehicles are being evacuated, it is highly likely that ground operations by by Russian forces are unlikely to occur while logistical support is stationed at the seaport.

Currently, there is no definitive information on the final destination of the cargo. However, some of our sources suggest that Libya could be a likely destination for at least part of the shipment. This is consistent with a recent report from sources cited by CNN

Libya, under Khalifa Haftar, has been identified as a potential recipient of some of the cargo loaded onto Russian planes at Khmeimim Airbase. The Wall Street Journal reported that radar systems for S-400 and S-300 interceptor systems were among the equipment being moved.

Throughout 2024, Russian forces were observed at multiple locations across Libya, including airbases and seaports. This map, made by the aeowinpact project, displays relatively recent Russia's activities in Libya

In 2023, Russia reportedly sought access to the ports of Benghazi and Tobruk. In 2024, Tobruk port was actively used for Russian logistical operations. Benghazi still remains a potential option, and it is not entirely off the table

Frontelligence Insight has reached out to John Lechner, a researcher and expert with extensive experience in the region, including on-ground reporting from Libya and connections with sources formerly tied to the Wagner Group - for a comment on this development:

”Haftar relies on the Russians to hold the military stalemate with Turkish-backed Tripoli. But he is most interested in keeping his geopolitical options open. A greater Russian presence in Libya will hardly be convenient. It is safe to assume that during their visits to Benghazi, U.S. officials, including AFRICOM's commander, have made it clear to Haftar that a Russian naval base is a red line. And the U.S. will certainly work to make any potential Russian host's life much more difficult. The Field Marshal is between a rock and a hard place.”

Should Turkiye perceive these operations as counter to its interests in Libya, it might limit its airspace for Russian cargo flights. Our calculations suggest that an IL-76 cargo plane, with cargo onboard, may face problems flying directly to Libya without Turkish airspace

This could compel Moscow to explore alternative routes, potentially requiring on-ground refueling in countries like Iran. Previously, Russia used Khmeimim Airbase in Syria as a logistical midpoint for operations between Russia and Africa

Meanwhile, Syria’s new government may still require foreign backing, such as Russia’s, to counterbalance other powerful factions within the country. For these reasons, it would be premature to entirely write off Russia’s role or presence in Syria.

Thank you for reading the summary of the article. For a deeper analysis, including the potential business impact for Russian oligarchs in Syria and the implications on the battlefield in Ukraine, please consider accessing the full article:

https://frontelligence.substack.com/p/syria-withdrawal-implications-for

Frontelligence Insight, after obtaining information about an ongoing operation at the Tartus seaport, has independently verified through additional means that Russia appears to be preparing to evacuate a substantial number of vehicles and equipment

Once Ukraine captures its first Korean POWs, expect the following narratives:

- They’re South Korean actors
- They’re North Korean defectors working for South Korean intelligence
- It’s just a single volunteer
- It’s an AI

No matter the evidence, the goalposts will be shifted

Proving to pro-russians that North Koreans are fighting against Ukraine is pointless. Show them actual footage with Koreans - they'll say they're Asian russians. When the Pentagon confirms it, they say it's a propaganda. No matter the evidence, they’ll simply move the goalposts

Friends, I hope you don’t mind me mentioning this again, even though it didn’t go as well as we hoped last time. Frontelligence Insight is working on several projects, including North Korean presence and a few surprises we’re excited to share later. Your support would mean a lot

If you find our investigations and insights valuable, please consider donating to help us stay independent and free from ties to organizations or governments. Your support makes a big difference! Here’s the link: https://buymeacoffee.com/frontelligence

The Pokrovsk direction, once known as the Avdiivka direction, remains one of the most active and difficult areas. After failing to seize the town directly, as in Novohrodivka, Russian forces pushed towards south of the town, creating an increasingly dangerous situation.

The fall of Selydove has allowed Russian forces to advance south of Pokrovsk, opening a path to Shevchenko, a key settlement before the town itself. With this vital position now almost lost, Russian forces can now expand to the south of Pokrovsk.

A particularly bad development reported to our team is the growing Russian effort to target supply routes leading to Pokrovsk with FPV drones. Ground reports to our team confirm that russians have successfully deployed FPV drones with fiber-optic cables along the E-50 highway

Reports from eyewitnesses on the ground indicate an alarming increase in FPV drone attacks targeting civilians in the Pokrovsk area:
- December 2. An FPV drone struck a civilian car traveling on the Udachne-Pokrovsk route, leaving the driver and passengers injured.

- December 3 (morning): Another FPV drone targeted a civilian car on the Kotlyne-Pokrovsk route, resulting in the death of the driver

- December 3 (later): A garbage truck in Zvirove, near Pokrovsk, was also struck by an FPV drone. The driver survived but sustained injuries

The underlying issues driving these developments remain largely unchanged: persistent problems that have plagued Ukrainian forces for months, including poor coordination at operational and strategic levels, a personnel shortage, lack of firepower and inadequate troop rotations

Ukrainian forces often demonstrate higher motivation, better training, and tactical agility, but the nature of Russian approach remains a problem. By employing small, continuous assaults, Russian troops eventually expose and exploit weak points in Ukrainian defenses

While this approach results in high Russian losses , which deemed unsustainable in the long term - it has proven effective in the short to medium term. This sustained pressure has allowed Russian forces to capture key operational strongholds, including Vuhledar and Avdiivka.

The situation is not hopeless, but it is deteriorating rapidly. Without swift action by the Ukrainian command to overhaul the command structure, improve resource distribution, and streamline truthful reporting, the fall of Pokrovsk may become inevitable in the near future

The full report can be found on our stack at this link.

https://frontelligence.substack.com/p/overview-of-the-operational-and-tactical

Please like and share to support us and boost visibility

Is the Qatar-Turkey pipeline, which would pass through Syria to supply Europe with gas as an alternative to Russian gas, back on the table?

Asking for a friend

One of the biggest lessons from Syria is that, just a month ago, almost no one could have predicted the Assad regime would fall today. The "realities on the ground" crowd would have denied such a possibility. A reminder of why people in Ukraine fight rather than surrender.

In 2015, Russia dramatically entered the Syrian war, firing missiles from the Caspian Sea and launching airstrikes. The display was meant to herald Moscow's resurgence as a global power capable of projecting force across the globe. After nearly a decade of effort, they lost

With the potential collapse of the Russia-backed Assad regime in Syria, propped up by Russian intervention since 2015, and the failure of Russia to secure a swift victory in Ukraine in 2022, which turned into a costly war of attrition, Russia’s future appears increasingly grim

Famous YouTuber Johnny Wharris, with 6 million followers, released a video titled "Why People Blame America for the War in Ukraine." He presented his argument in it, essentially blaming the West for causing Russia's imperialistic rise. I find it necessary to respond

In essence, Johnny claims that after the USSR collapse, Russia was excluded from Western society and draws parallels to the treatment of Weimar Germany under the Treaty of Versailles, suggesting that an unjust settlement fueled militarization in both cases

So, what's wrong with that vision? First, shortly after the Soviet Union's collapse, Russia engaged in conflicts and created pro-Russian pseudo-states, a scenario it later replicated in Ukraine in 2014. Specific examples include Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 1992–1993.

Another, more publicly known act was the war in Moldova, where Russian forces occupied the region now known as Transnistria, establishing another pro-Russian quasi-state. This occurred in 1992 and had absolutely no connection to NATO.

In 1994, when the Chechen Republic pursued independence - mirroring other Soviet republics distancing themselves from Moscow - Boris Yeltsin, then hailed as a Western democrat, responded with military action against Chechnya. Again, this had nothing to do with NATO.

At the time, the United States was, in fact, providing substantial financial aid to Russia. Between fiscal years 1990 and 1994 alone, USAID obligated $1.4 billion and spent $539 million on programs and projects in Russia, according to NSIAD-95-156.

Additionally, there were numerous loans, programs, and economic aid packages totaling billions of dollars. By 1997, Russia was welcomed into the G7, transforming it into the G8. Following the 1998 financial crisis in Russia, the West coordinated an $11.2 billion IMF bailout.

Russia also significantly expanded its trade relations with Western countries. To suggest that Russia faced a "Versailles treatment" grossly misrepresents the facts. By 2010, Russia had even begun negotiations with the EU for a visa-free regime.

Of course, not everything was perfect on the Western side. I agree that the West made certain missteps that undermined its own order. A far more relevant example than the one Johnny provides would be the Iraq War, which violated principles the U.S. itself established

That said, the main flaw in Johnny’s argument is a failure to recognize that NATO expansion wasn’t primarily driven by the US. It was European states, once occupied by the Soviet Union: Poland, Hungary, Czechia, Slovakia, Romania, and the Baltic states that sought membership

The sole reason these nations joined NATO was their fear of Russia, grounded in the historical consequences of Soviet occupation. Given Russia’s ongoing aggression toward its neighbors, their decision was entirely rational and justified

These countries seized the opportunity when it presented itself. Unfortunately, Ukraine missed this window, initiating the process much later. Ukraine’s NATO aspirations arose from its growing concerns about Russian pressure. For example 2003 Tuzla Island Conflict

Russia also tends to shift its narrative. In 2014, when Russian troops invaded Eastern Ukraine and Crimea, the narrative was that Russia was there to protect its Russian-speaking population. Over time, this argument evolved into a claim of "protecting against NATO."

In conclusion, my recommendation is to understand the nature of wars by moving away from viewing them through the Cold War lens and instead approaching them as more complex issues involving independent states making decisions outside the US-Russia(USSR) Cold War paradigm.

The military recruitment crisis in Europe, with few willing to fight for their country or even serve in peacetime, is a symptom of a deeper crisis in the concept of the modern nation, not just a failure of any single economic or social policy.

Much has been written about Russia's economy, but even well-regarded Western outlets have only scratched the surface. Frustrated by such shallow analysis, our team interviewed a former deputy minister of energy, whose answers provided us with a complete picture.

The full interview: https://frontelligence.substack.com/p/war-deficits-and-the-russian-economy

Thank you for reading.

This is a brief excerpt from the full interview, which includes additional insights and data. To read the complete conversation, please follow this link: https://frontelligence.substack.com/p/war-deficits-and-the-russian-economy

With Russia's budget deficit at 3.3 trillion rubles, 21% key interest rate and 2-3 million job vacancies, Russia has to choose between hyperinflation or an economic freeze, says Vladimir Milov, former Deputy Minister of Energy in an interview with Frontelligence Insight

Vladimir Milov, an economist and longtime ally of Alexei Navalny, explains that Russian markets are gloomy ahead of the Central Bank’s board meeting on Dec 20. The Bank is expected to raise interest rates once again, from the current 21%, possibly to 23% or even 25%

For Central Bank to continue interest rate hikes means to kill the real sector of the economy, where most companies simply don't have sufficient profitability to borrow at current interest rates (Central Bank's 21% rate translates into 25-30% commercial loan rates)

Relaxing tight monetary policies and lowering interest rates would push Russia into hyperinflation territory. However, the "elephant in the room" is the war, which is the root cause of all these problems. The war drives extreme military spending, which fuels inflation

Ruble depreciation will contribute to inflation even further, as Russia continues to be heavily reliant on imports... while being under all sorts of embargoes, and China and other Global South countries are not opening their markets to most Russian goods

When current revenues are insufficient to cover budget expenses, the state must find alternative sources to finance the deficit. In the current situation, Russia is cut off from international financial markets and cannot turn to Western governments or the IMF for assistance

This is what Russia has typically done in a deep systematic crisis: in the last years of the Russian Empire during World War I, or of the USSR during the 1980s, the government heavily borrowed money from the West, which prolonged the existence of the empire - but not for long

Now, this option is not available, and neither China nor other countries of the Global South are interested in providing loans to Russia. China doesn't even agree to give a permit to the Russian government to issue yuan-nominated Russian state bonds.

Russia can still borrow domestically, which it tries to do...but with high interest rates and rising state bond yields (10-year OFZ bond auctions over 17%), it makes no sense: the government spends more on servicing expensive debt than it raises through OFZ bond placements

The only option left is depleting the state's reserves (National Wealth Fund), whose liquidity portion is down to just 5.5 trillion rubles ($56 billion) as of November 1, 2024. The budget deficit for 2024 is planned to reach 3.3 trillion rubles, or 60% of the liquidity

There are currently around 2-3 million job vacancies in the labor market and this number is growing. Most industries - manufacturing, agriculture, logistics, retail, utilities, and IT report shortages of workers, measured in hundreds of thousands or 10%-50% of the workforce

To give you an idea about how bad the labor market situation, reference to the discussions at the annual "Russian Industrialist" forum held in St. Petersburg. One of the main ideas on how to ease labor shortage problem is hiring teenagers under 18 and pensioners to work

This is a key reason why Putin, contrary to many forecasts, hasn't called for a second wave of mandatory mobilization since Autumn 2022. This is not to say that he can't do it, but this would be a disastrous hit for the labor market

There are no sources of good news for the Russian economy on the horizon, only bad news. War-driven inflation is not reacting to the Central Bank's interest hikes. By 2022, it was expected that Russia would be on its feet, with import substitution. None of this is happening

Putin may continue the present course for some time, but 2025 will be some kind of moment of truth for him. The clock is ticking. We're not there yet - but at some point soon, Putin will have to seriously reconsider continuation of the war