When Bashar al-Assad’s regime fell in Syria, a critical geopolitical question emerged: can Russia maintain its foothold in the MENA region, and if so, how? What does this mean for Ukraine? Below are the key points from the latest Frontelligence Insight report:
Maxar satellite images, dated December 17, show an unusual buildup of vehicles at the Tartus Naval Base. Video from site show that most of these vehicles are logistical, with only a few appearing to be combat vehicles. We identified approximately 150 vehicles and 29 containers
It is assessed that the vehicles are likely being prepared for evacuation from the Tartus by naval vessels. Indications suggest that two Russian cargo ships, Sparta and Ursa Major, could be involved in the operation. It could take over a week for them to reach the port
While it cannot be confirmed with absolute certainty that all these vehicles are being evacuated, it is highly likely that ground operations by by Russian forces are unlikely to occur while logistical support is stationed at the seaport.
Currently, there is no definitive information on the final destination of the cargo. However, some of our sources suggest that Libya could be a likely destination for at least part of the shipment. This is consistent with a recent report from sources cited by CNN
Libya, under Khalifa Haftar, has been identified as a potential recipient of some of the cargo loaded onto Russian planes at Khmeimim Airbase. The Wall Street Journal reported that radar systems for S-400 and S-300 interceptor systems were among the equipment being moved.
Throughout 2024, Russian forces were observed at multiple locations across Libya, including airbases and seaports. This map, made by the aeowinpact project, displays relatively recent Russia's activities in Libya
In 2023, Russia reportedly sought access to the ports of Benghazi and Tobruk. In 2024, Tobruk port was actively used for Russian logistical operations. Benghazi still remains a potential option, and it is not entirely off the table
Frontelligence Insight has reached out to John Lechner, a researcher and expert with extensive experience in the region, including on-ground reporting from Libya and connections with sources formerly tied to the Wagner Group - for a comment on this development:
”Haftar relies on the Russians to hold the military stalemate with Turkish-backed Tripoli. But he is most interested in keeping his geopolitical options open. A greater Russian presence in Libya will hardly be convenient. It is safe to assume that during their visits to Benghazi, U.S. officials, including AFRICOM's commander, have made it clear to Haftar that a Russian naval base is a red line. And the U.S. will certainly work to make any potential Russian host's life much more difficult. The Field Marshal is between a rock and a hard place.”
Should Turkiye perceive these operations as counter to its interests in Libya, it might limit its airspace for Russian cargo flights. Our calculations suggest that an IL-76 cargo plane, with cargo onboard, may face problems flying directly to Libya without Turkish airspace
This could compel Moscow to explore alternative routes, potentially requiring on-ground refueling in countries like Iran. Previously, Russia used Khmeimim Airbase in Syria as a logistical midpoint for operations between Russia and Africa
Meanwhile, Syria’s new government may still require foreign backing, such as Russia’s, to counterbalance other powerful factions within the country. For these reasons, it would be premature to entirely write off Russia’s role or presence in Syria.
Thank you for reading the summary of the article. For a deeper analysis, including the potential business impact for Russian oligarchs in Syria and the implications on the battlefield in Ukraine, please consider accessing the full article:
https://frontelligence.substack.com/p/syria-withdrawal-implications-for
Maxar satellite images, dated December 17, show an unusual buildup of vehicles at the Tartus Naval Base. Video from site show that most of these vehicles are logistical, with only a few appearing to be combat vehicles. We identified approximately 150 vehicles and 29 containers
It is assessed that the vehicles are likely being prepared for evacuation from the Tartus by naval vessels. Indications suggest that two Russian cargo ships, Sparta and Ursa Major, could be involved in the operation. It could take over a week for them to reach the port
While it cannot be confirmed with absolute certainty that all these vehicles are being evacuated, it is highly likely that ground operations by by Russian forces are unlikely to occur while logistical support is stationed at the seaport.
Currently, there is no definitive information on the final destination of the cargo. However, some of our sources suggest that Libya could be a likely destination for at least part of the shipment. This is consistent with a recent report from sources cited by CNN
Libya, under Khalifa Haftar, has been identified as a potential recipient of some of the cargo loaded onto Russian planes at Khmeimim Airbase. The Wall Street Journal reported that radar systems for S-400 and S-300 interceptor systems were among the equipment being moved.
Throughout 2024, Russian forces were observed at multiple locations across Libya, including airbases and seaports. This map, made by the aeowinpact project, displays relatively recent Russia's activities in Libya
In 2023, Russia reportedly sought access to the ports of Benghazi and Tobruk. In 2024, Tobruk port was actively used for Russian logistical operations. Benghazi still remains a potential option, and it is not entirely off the table
Frontelligence Insight has reached out to John Lechner, a researcher and expert with extensive experience in the region, including on-ground reporting from Libya and connections with sources formerly tied to the Wagner Group - for a comment on this development:
”Haftar relies on the Russians to hold the military stalemate with Turkish-backed Tripoli. But he is most interested in keeping his geopolitical options open. A greater Russian presence in Libya will hardly be convenient. It is safe to assume that during their visits to Benghazi, U.S. officials, including AFRICOM's commander, have made it clear to Haftar that a Russian naval base is a red line. And the U.S. will certainly work to make any potential Russian host's life much more difficult. The Field Marshal is between a rock and a hard place.”
Should Turkiye perceive these operations as counter to its interests in Libya, it might limit its airspace for Russian cargo flights. Our calculations suggest that an IL-76 cargo plane, with cargo onboard, may face problems flying directly to Libya without Turkish airspace
This could compel Moscow to explore alternative routes, potentially requiring on-ground refueling in countries like Iran. Previously, Russia used Khmeimim Airbase in Syria as a logistical midpoint for operations between Russia and Africa
Meanwhile, Syria’s new government may still require foreign backing, such as Russia’s, to counterbalance other powerful factions within the country. For these reasons, it would be premature to entirely write off Russia’s role or presence in Syria.
Thank you for reading the summary of the article. For a deeper analysis, including the potential business impact for Russian oligarchs in Syria and the implications on the battlefield in Ukraine, please consider accessing the full article:
https://frontelligence.substack.com/p/syria-withdrawal-implications-for